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Abstract
The WTO Appellate Body (AB) has produced a volume-wise important body of case law, which is
often difficult to penetrate, never mind classify. Howse (2016) has attempted a very lucid taxonomy of
the case law using the standard of review as benchmark for it. His conclusion is that the AB is quite
cautious when facing nondiscriminatory measures, especially measures relating to the protection of
human life and health, while it has adopted a more intrusive (into national sovereignty) standard when
dealing with trade measures (like antidumping), which are by definition discriminatory as they
concern imports only. In my response, I share his basic conclusion with no buts and ifs. I simply add
that this approach is not the outcome of a process that mandates this standard of review, but simply a
political (e.g., nonlegal) reaction aimed at placating its clientele, the WTO membership.
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1. The Argument*
This paper is a reaction to Howse (2016). The brass tracks of Howse’s argument is that the WTO
Appellate Body (AB) has adopted a rather deferential standard towards domestic policies, which have
to be nondiscriminatory anyway, and a more intrusive attitude when dealing with trade instruments,
which by definition concern imports only. I propose to entertain my response in three parts.
In the brief Section 2, I will ask the question whether there are statutory underpinnings supporting
the approach privileged by the AB. My response is no. If at all, the framers of the WTO wanted panels
and the AB to adopt a deferential standard of review, when dealing with antidumping, and not with
domestic instruments. The AB undid the statutory premise, and applied deference not to disputes
regarding trade-, but to disputes regarding domestic instruments (policies). This is all judge made law,
it reflects the quintessential belief of the AB how things should be done, and Howse is absolutely right
to single out this element.
In Section 3, I move to discuss the practice of the AB decision. I will place it in its historical
context, and explain briefly the GATT case law first, which was toing and froing between deference
and intrusiveness when dealing with domestic instruments. The AB in its remarkable US-Shrimp
report decided at least one contentious issue for good, namely that domestic instruments would not be
judged illegal simply because they had been unilaterally adopted. The AB has not nevertheless,
adopted a consistent standard of review across domestic instruments, and has outlawed many of them
on shaky evidence. Still, it will not tinker with measures aiming to protect human health. That much is
for sure. The AB on the other hand, when dealing with border instruments, has imposed stringent
requirements on key disciplines, like causality. The AB however, has sugarcoated this approach
through soft remedies, and generous (for the regulator) understanding of the obligations regarding
continued imposition of duties (sunset reviews).
In Section 4, I will advance my explanation why the AB has adopted this approach. In my view, the
approach is warranted and rests on solid grounds. Parties have little incentive to reveal the rationale
behind adoption of their domestic policies, and, absent similar knowledge, it is often hard to decide on
who is right or wrong. Risk averse courts, worried about the institutional implications of false
positives, might rationally prefer to avoid outlawing challenged measures. Alas, the AB has not
followed a similar path in developing its approach. It has behaved as a political body reacting to signs
of times, a ‘Warren Court’ of trade, rather than a court that has developed its own understanding of the
rationale for, and the objective function of the agreements that it is called to interpret. The quest for
contextual understanding of the key terms remains, as a result, elusive. Predictions regarding the
manner in which it will treat similar cases in the future are equally impossible to make.
Section 5 recaps my main conclusions.

2. Standard of Review: Statutory Language and Practice
The AB did not start from a clean slate when developing its standard of review. In fact, it was called to
use one generic standard of review across all cases, and another, arguably more deferential, in
antidumping disputes. The AB developed its standards of review against this explicit will of the
framers to treat a trade instrument, antidumping, in more deferential manner than any other measure
coming under the ambit of the WTO.

*

For helpful discussions and comments on previous drafts, I would like to thank Bill Davey, Henrik Horn, and Damien J.
Neven for many discussions of the issue and comments on previous drafts.
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2.1 Two Statutory Standards of Review
Article 11 of the DSU (Dispute Settlement Understanding) requests from panels to make an ‘objective
assessment’ of the matter before them, without any further clarifications. Of interest to our discussion
is not the substantive content of this standard. What we care about is the fact that the DSU provides for
one standard to be applied across all cases, irrespective whether we deal with trade or domestic
instruments (policies). There is only exceptional standard, that reflected in Article 17.6(ii) of the
Agreement on Antidumping (AD), which was meant to apply only to disputes regarding impositions
of AD duties.
This provision (Article 17.6(ii)) repeats in the first sentence a constraint that the DSU also
acknowledges (Article 3.2), namely, that panels (and the AB) should have recourse to the customary
laws of public international law, when interpreting the WTO contract. The second sentence though,
calls for panels (and the AB) to refrain from going any further when they have encountered an
interpretation of the terms that is ‘permissible’. The working hypothesis for the framers must have
been that more than one permissible interpretation was possible, at least on occasion. It is clear, that
the US, the instigator of this provision, had in mind a deferential standard of review.1 Various
negotiating documents support this conclusion.2
2.2 The AB, Master and Commander
Against this background, the AB performed two innovations: first, it merged the two standards into
one, and, second, it elevated protection of human health to the pedestal of global values.
2.2.1 And the Two Shall Become One
With two early exceptions,3 panels have sided with the AB report in US-Hot Rolled Steel (§62), where
the AB saw no disharmony between the two statutory standards of review discussed above. De facto,
this meant the end of deference in antidumping disputes.
2.2.2 The Importance of Objective Sought
In EC-Asbestos, the AB underscored that it would be shaping its standard of review in light of the
importance of the regulatory objective pursued. In subsequent case law, it became clear what the AB
meant: a deferential approach when protection of human health was at stake, and a more intrusive
standard when other societal preferences were at stake.4

3. From Broad Lines to Deets
So far I have attempted to explain the broad lines of the AB standards of review? What does this all
mean in practice? How has the AB operationalized its preferred standard of review?
3.1 Domestic Instruments: Belts and Suspenders (in Principle)
The AB inherited GATT case law, which in part it kept, and in part it rejected. GATT panels had
struggled with the question of standard of review. Although formally they had adopted a “no effects

1
2
3
4

Croley and Jackson (1996).
Stewart et al. (1993) refer to many of them.
Both are discussed in Mavroidis (2016), Chapter 2, volume 2.
Mavroidis (2016) Chapter 7, volume 1, and Sykes (2003) discuss this case law.
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cum no intent” standard, which, prima facie might sound quite intrusive (as it allows panels to outlaw
measures that might have no demonstrable protectionist effect, while not inquiring into the intent at
all), they have in fact attempted to show deference towards regulatory intent, to the extent that they
were persuaded that it was not protectionist. We explain.
3.1.1 Debates in GATT
GATT panels struggled with the legal discipline regarding domestic instruments. The originally
prevailing view was that the rationale for intervention should matter only as grounds justifying
deviation from an obligation. Fearing that this approach would lead to an understanding of the GATT
as instrument for deregulation (rather than nondiscrimination, its original purpose), two reports
endorsed the “aims and effect”-test, where likeness of goods would be function of the regulatory
purpose. Measures aiming to protect noneconomic preferences would thus, be judged GATTconsistent. GATT panels did not elaborate a meticulous intent-test, when doing so. They would satisfy
themselves on absence of protectionism on little evidence to this effect.5
Case law was thus oscillating between an analysis where regulatory intent was irrelevant, and
where it was the centerpiece of the inquiry.
There are two reasons why deference should not be regarded as the dominant standard of review.
First, the quintessential report reflecting the deferential standard (US-Taxes on Automobiles) remained
un-adopted, and consequently, of limited legal value. Second, because in a subsequent case, US-Tuna
I (Mexico), the panel outlawed a US measure simply because it was unilateral, without even reaching
the stage to ask the question regarding the relevance of the aim. This panel did not even ask itself how
could it ever be right in light of the fact that all measures challenged under Articles III and/or XI of
GATT were unilateral, and here it was dealing with a defense against a violation of the latter
provision.
At the very least thus, the GATT did not leave a legacy of consistency regarding the treatment of
domestic policies. The AB inherited this legacy. How did it go about it?
3.1.2 First, a Huge Sigh of Relief
US-Shrimp is a remarkable report. The AB set the record straight when holding that unilateral policies
are not inconsistent simply because they are unilateral. It was a head on reversal of the US-Shrimp I
(Mexico) GATT case law, which had stated that the opposite was true. But of course the GATT panel
could not have been right. The GATT was a tariff bargain supported by a negative integration regime.
Its members were not required to adopt common policies. They could design their domestic policies to
their liking as long as they applied them in nondiscriminatory manner.
Nondiscrimination was legalese for absence of protectionism, an elusive concept, which the
GATT-think reduced to a negotiable instrument, tariffs. All accounts of the GATT that extensively
refer to the negotiating record, from early on Wilcox (1949), to the seminal work of Baldwin (1970),
and Jackson (1969), to most recent inquiries like that by Irwin et al. (2008) agree on this score. Under
the circumstances, US-Tuna I (Mexico) could have never been right, and US-Shrimp was a welcome
sea change.
Of course, it could never be the case that unilateral policies are necessarily legal either. A
discrimination (protectionism) test had to be devised as well. The question for the AB was whether it
should pick one of the two tests already developed in GATT case law, or whether it should develop its
5

Hudec (1998) offers an excellent description of the “aims and effect” test, and why inquiries into regulatory intent,
irrespective of the manner in which the test had been applied in case law, was necessary for GATT to be understood as an
instrument for nondiscrimination, and nothing beyond that.
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own. In name, it adopted the “marketplace”-test. Regulatory intent would be of relevance in a very
limited set of circumstances when the burden of proof rests with the complainant (Chile-Alcoholic
Beverages), and quite relevant when the burden of proof would shift to the defendant that would have
to have recourse to the list of general exceptions (Article XX of GATT) in order to justify violation of
an obligation. In practice, it managed to create a mess through a mix of contradictions, open-ended
statements, and difficult to grasp decisions, as I will try to explain in what now follows.
3.1.3 Then, the AB Missed the Compass
I think I am not the only professor of WTO law that, over the years, has found it exceedingly hard to
explain the nondiscrimination test devised by the AB.
In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, consumers would define likeness, preferably through the use of
the best predictor we have, cross-price elasticity. Less favourable treatment, at least in the panel’s
(clearer) reading of the situation, did not exist because the measure imposed a higher burden on
imported competing goods, and the defendant had not advanced any policy rationale to justify its
choices. Indeed, as the panel observed, Japan only ex post facto came up with an explanation that
differential taxation was meant to protect traditional production processes.
Every report that followed instead of improving the situation, substantially muddied the waters. In
Korea-Alcoholic Beverages, recourse to econometric indicators and noneconometric indicators was
put at par. This could well be the case, if the former yield no adequate response (because, for example,
a good has been de facto banned from a market through discriminatory domestic taxation).
Surprisingly, price of goods was absent from the list of relevant factors, as if purchasing decision for
the majority of consumers are not function of scarcity of monetary resources.
Likeness was function of competitive relationship and sharing the same six-digit classification
(Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II). The AB added that the same would be the case when goods are in
very intensive competitive relationship. Then comes Philippines-Distilled Spirits. The AB is dealing
with goods that do not share the same six-digit classification, but which, in its view are still like,
because they are in intense competitive relationship. It refers to studies that measured the cross-price
elasticity coefficient, and the resulting range was between 0.01 and 0.07. This is quite low by any
reasonable benchmark. A value of 0.01 would imply that a tax on imports that increases the price of
imports by 50 percent would increase the volume for the domestic product by 0.5 percent, which is
close to nothing. The products, hence, should have been considered almost independent goods and not
market-like, as far as degree of substitution goes. If elasticity was only marginally smaller, and it
equaled 0, the two products would be completely independent. The AB tries to make up for this
arguing that the goods share the same end uses etc. A bicycle and an airplane though share the same
end use (transport), but no one would call them like goods.
Alas, there is worse. In EC-Asbestos, likeness is delinked from market analysis. Two goods are like
if a ‘reasonable consumer’ so thinks, and no market evidence to this effect is warranted. The judgment
of the members of the AB (the ‘reasonable consumer’, for all practical purposes) can substitute for
that. This was bad news for Canadians, who in the eyes of the AB must be unreasonable.6 The good
news for the defendant was that, because the two pairs of construction material (with-, and without
asbestos) were considered unlike, it did not have to defend its policies any further. Likeness was
function of the properties of the goods concerned, and their potential negative impact on human

6

To avoid misunderstandings, in Grossman et al. (2013), I published my views when stating that EU should have prevailed
but not because the two goods were unlike. It should have prevailed because France was not affording less favourable
treatment when banning sales of health-impairing goods. It is the privilege of any WTO member to define its level of
protection, and France can have a higher level of protection than Canada if it so wishes, but those who disagree are not
necessarily unreasonable.
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health. This case law established the importance of the objective as relevant criterion to decide on the
degree of deference that panels should show to the regulator.
And when we thought we had seen the end of innovation, along came the AB report on ArgentinaFinancial Services, where likeness was presumed this time. The AB invented a concept that it had
never used before, and made us wonder what exactly it meant with “presumption of likeness”.7
The interpretation of less favourable treatment presents us with similar discomfort. In Dominican
Republic-Import and Sale of Cigarettes, following toing and froing towards every imaginable
direction, the AB seemed to have set the record straight when stating that measures creating disparate
effects would not judged inconsistent, if the rationale for the adoption of measure was unrelated to the
origin of the good. Then comes EC-Seal Products. The AB deplores our poor reading of the
unambiguous and hard to misunderstand paragraphs in its previous report, and states that presence of
disparate effects means less favourable treatment.
This case law casts doubt on the generic relevance of the deference standard to domestic policies.
Deference was effectively limited to cases where human health is at stake (EC-Asbestos), and not
when other societal preferences are advanced.8 In fact, a number of domestic policies have been
outlawed on shaky evidence.
Korea-Various Measures on Beef offers an adequate illustration of this point. The AB outlawed a
nondiscriminatory measure (dual retailing) that, in its own admission, was genuinely aiming at
protecting the stated regulatory objective. It held that the measure was unnecessary, but did not
provide any evidence regarding the disparate trade impact of the measure. If the intent was legitimate,
and disparate trade effects were absent,9 on what evidence was the measure judged GATTinconsistent?
The situation is alas, worse when it comes to disputes under the TBT- and the SPS Agreements. In
EC-Hormones, the AB accepts the zero-risk policy (whatever it means) practiced by the European
Union, and goes so far as to suggest that the precautionary principle is not confined to Article 5.7 of
SPS (as some, including me, might have thought), but permeates the whole agreement. 10 A few years
later, Japan invokes zero-risk policy with respect to fire blight, an apples disease. In Japan-Apples, the
AB finds nothing wrong with the risk assessment supplied by the defendant, but outlaws the measure
because it considers it unnecessary. This report looks like an one bad apple, as Neven and Weiler
(2006) have suggested, and lends suspicion to those arguing that the AB serves one sauce for the
goose and one for the gander. The probably more likely explanation though is that the objective
pursued by the EU (protection of human health) defined endogenously the standard of review for the
AB.
3.1.4 Deference Yes, but to a Limited Class of Domestic Policies, Namely …
So what do I conclude from the above? First, the AB cannot be accused of having provided a clear
methodology that will enable it (and subsequent panels) to distinguish wheat from chaff. There is no
nondiscrimination test, the proxy to decide on protectionist behaviour. Some early honourable
attempts have been followed by subsequent confusion as to what the original attempts amounted to,
and, even more to the point, where we now stand on this score. There are four key terms in the body of
7

8
9

10

Of course, likeness can never be presumed, since different consumers in different markets may react in different ways to
the same pair of goods, and, absent some market research, the competitive relationship between the goods cannot be
established.
Sykes (2003).
The panel had found that Korea was routinely absorbing the legal import quota in place. This was quite normal, in light
of the difference between the world- and the Korean price for beef.
Davey (2006) offers a very comprehensive analysis.
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Article III of GATT: “like”; directly competitive or substitutable”; “in excess”; “applied so as to
afford protection”. There is confusion regarding the understanding of three of them. Only the term “in
excess” has been consistently understood as denoting arithmetical difference.
Second, that the AB has adopted a deferential standard of review but towards some domestic
policies, namely measures aiming to protect human life and/or health.
Third, that it did not provide any reason for doing so other than the fact that in its view risks to
human life and/or health deserve maximum deference.
This leads me to conclude that the deferential standard towards measures aiming to protect public
health is not the outcome of analysis that led the AB to take the view that it was facing serious
evidentiary issues when dealing with challenges against domestic policies. It is a knee-jerk reaction to
what is to most the highest value, the quintessential human right.
3.2 Trade Instruments: Gung Ho (in Principle)
The AB has inherited a very rich case law in the realm of trade instruments from the GATT-era.
Although disputes regarding tariff treatment were infrequent in the GATT, case law in antidumping
provided a lot of ammunition for heated discussion across the membership.
3.2.1 GATT Debates
Disputes regarding trade instruments multiplied following the advent of the Tokyo round codes. Case
law especially in antidumping and countervailing stands for the proposition that remedies in this
context should be retroactive. If Home was found to have imposed antidumping duties illegally so,
Foreign could request repayment of all duties perceived between the original imposition and the time
when the panel had pronounced on the illegality. This remedy did not go down well, especially with
the EU and the US. In fact, as Hudec (1993) explains, the introduction of retroactive remedies was a
reason why the rate of adoption of GATT panel reports fell in the eighties.
In Mavroidis (2016a), I argued that the EU and the US attempted to reverse this trend during the
Uruguay round negotiations, to no avail. Law (the DSU) did not formally adopt their motion to
introduce prospective remedies, and it was left to panels and the AB to resolve this issue.
On the other hand, case law was rather ‘gentle’ when it came to examining whether the
requirements for lawful imposition and/or review of duties imposed had been met. A perfectly
representative illustration concerns a Swedish claim in US–Swedish Steel Plate. The panel decided
that it was not warranted for the US to review 20-year-old duties, even though the following was true:


Sweden had reduced its production of steel products;



It was selling more to the EU because it had signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with it (and EU
had eliminated duties on imports of Swedish steel);



Avesta (a Swedish company) had bought a mill in Indiana and, consequently, was selling to the
US market through its Indiana site;



US had concluded a voluntary export restraint with many exporters, as a result of which the
health of US industry had considerably improved (§§ 246ff.).

This is a very restrictive interpretation of the “where warranted” standard, which regulated when
duties should be reviewed, by any reasonable benchmark.
The combination of the two trends in case law meant that panels would not mess around
lightheartedly with impositions, but when they did, they would apply tough standards.
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3.2.2 Even Tougher
The AB tightened the screws in several directions in the realm of contingent protection. I have already
explained why, in my view at least, the AB set aside the expressed intent of the instigators of the
standard of review embedded in Article 17.6(ii) of Antidumping.
The AB made recourse to contingent protection even more onerous through its (correct in my view)
understanding of the causality requirement. Anything can affect the trade outcome, and a trigger happy
investigating authority is often happy to attribute to dumped- or subsidized- or increased imports the
injury inflicted by other factors. Why blame bad investment, for example, when jobs are at stake, and
costs can be shifted to foreign producers?
The AB requested evidence of genuine and substantial relationship between cause and effect before
recourse to duties has been made. And this time, it meant business. The standard as understood by the
AB requires attribution of injury to say increased imports, and evidence of nonattribution of injury to
increased imports when other factors have caused it. It requests from WTO members to examine their
conclusions in light of other alternative explanations, and decide on the imposition of duties only when
they have done so. Sykes (2003a), reading the case law, has gone so far as to ask whether it will ever
be possible for an (elaborate) investigating authority to meet the test established in case law? We
would add that case law in the realm of nondiscrimination would have been drastically different had
the AB adopted a similar understanding of the causality-requirement there as well. Howse (2016) is
certainly right in pointing the discrepancy in this direction.11
3.2.3 A Touch of Mild
The AB cannot be accused for consistency. Consistency, of course, is not per se a value, for one can
be consistently wrong. Explanations of inconsistencies though, are warranted for courts to retain their
credibility. Under the circumstances, it is quite odd that the AB refused to see a causality requirement
in sunset reviews. Why is it the case that one needs to show that dumping causes injury in the original
investigation, and not so at the sunset-stage? The AB pointed to the absence of specific language to
this effect. True. But does the absence of specific language lead to the conclusion that, whereas only
injurious dumping can be sanctioned at the stage of original investigation, noninjurious dumping can
be counteracted at the sunset-stage? Had the AB investigated even briefly the negotiating record, it
would have realized that the introduction of sunset reviews was a hard fought victory for its
proponents. The whole idea was that duties lapse, unless a sunset review points to recurrence of injury
in case of withdrawal. Negotiators a small window for continued imposition of duties. The AB turned
it into a wide avenue.
Indeed, Howse and Staiger (2007) expressed their profound disagreement with this statement, and
argued for a comprehensive legal test that could be applied in order to sustain the plausibility of
continued impositions. The AB turned a blind eye to this paper, as it consistently does to academic
writings that rarely if ever feature in footnotes. As a result, an investigating authority can routinely
meet the sunset requirements. While sunset reviews exist only in antidumping and countervailing, the
least disturbing (for international trade purposes) form of contingent protection, namely safeguards, is
the one that WTO members will have more difficulty in employing.12

11

12

It is true that, on occasion, the AB on the one hand announces a very demanding causality test, only to decide on
causality on shaky basis a few paragraphs later. The standard announced though, might still serve as some sort of
signaling mechanism to the effect that the AB will take this exercise seriously.
There are other examples of soft behavior by the AB. In the softwood lumber disputes for example, the AB disregarded
the explicit wording of Article 14 of SCM, and went on to justify the use of benefit calculation by the US that did not
correspond to any of the standards reflected in the exhaustive (on textual grounds, at the very least) list of this provision.
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The AB has not pronounced in comprehensive manner on remedies. WTO panels, with one
exception, have consistently held that remedies are prospective, that is, the obligation to compensate
kicks in from the end of the reasonable period of time during which unsuccessful defendants must
bring their measures into compliance with the WTO. This is a major concession to the members that
defended this view during the Uruguay round, and did not manage to persuade the rest of the
membership on this score.13 The AB has implicitly sided with this approach.
So tough yes, the AB has been tougher on trade instruments than it has when adjudicating disputes
about domestic policies. But at the end of the day, losers know that they will not be severely punished
for breaking the law. Cheap exit for the first five years or so is now de facto institutionalized.
3.2.4 And, as Usual, a Lot of Confusion
There are numerous inconsistencies in case law on trade instruments, and in this respect, the AB
reproduces the record of its case law under domestic instruments. To provide but one illustration, I
will refer to the case on pass-through, a major issue in subsidies.
The AB dealt in quick succession with two cases regarding pass through, both discussed in
Grossman and Mavroidis (2007). The first time it held that payment of market price when goods are
privatized always exhausts previously bestowed benefits. In the second, it held that privatization at
arm’s length could result in exhaustion of similar benefits. Both findings cannot be right, one of them
has to be wrong. And yet, the AB did not even bother to address the inconsistency between the two
reports. Errare humanum est, and it does not diminish the credibility of a court to state that it has
erred. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) certainly did not suffer when in its notorious Keck &
Mithouard judgment took explicitly distance from prior case law.
There is worse. The AB never explained in its second decision under what conditions payment of
market price exhausts benefits. And, it did not ask the correct question in neither of the reports, which,
as Grossman and Mavroidis (2007) show is whether the investment has (or has not) become
inframarginal. The result is predictably, confusion, and there is proof for it. Amazingly, the proof of
confusion has been reflected in an AB report. In EC and Certain Member States-Large Civil Aircraft,
the three members of the division had three different opinions regarding extinction of subsidies as a
result of privatization at arm’s length when a “fair market value” had been paid (§726).

4. The AB Legacy
Stein (1981) offers this wonderful passage when trying to explain the merits of keeping the Court, a
decisive court, away from the public eye:
tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with the benign
neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal type structure in Europe.

I have often wondered how the AB members when they go back and revisit their work. What will they
think of reports a hundred and twenty pages long only to announce at the end that they could not
decide the issue before them? What will they think of the confusion they have created through
hundreds of pages where the same issue is discussed from all sorts of unnecessary angles only to
confirm a decision they have reached in the first paragraph of the discussion? And what will they think
when asking themselves, how much they have contributed into making the WTO a policy-relevant
instrument across the membership?
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4.1 Political Deference vs. Deference when in Uncertainty
Deference is of course, defensible, when dealing with disputes concerning domestic policies. The
typical scenario would be a case where only Home knows the rationale for regulating, and it would
have little incentive to inform Foreign about it. If Home reveals the truth (regulation is meant to
protect the domestic matador), it goes to jail. If Home lies, then it might be out of jail. It is a classic
prisoner’s dilemma. The question for the judge will be to devise a test that will provide Home with the
incentives to reveal the true information. And even then, uncertainty might still persist. Wise courts
would then, in face of uncertainty, avoid committing a false positive, and would defer to the legislator.
The fact that the legislation is anyway nondiscriminatory on its face at least, and that the reputation of
the institution might suffer if panels go at it hammers and tong, are factors that reinforce the argument
for deference.
What did the AB do? None of the above, is the short answer. It devised a “no intent-cum-no trade
effects”- standard, that allows it, unconstrained by any methodological discipline, to decide cases
brought before it.14 Under the circumstances, deference that the AB shows is the automatic
consequence of the decision by regulators to protect human health. There is nothing more to it.
Let us compare for a moment with the attitude the AB has shown when addressing say
antidumping. It is true that the contingent protection instruments reflect an injury standard, and a
statutory requirement for demonstration of causality between say dumping and injury. The discipline
on domestic instruments does not. But is this reason enough to abandon a serious causality analysis,
and replace it by guesswork, and a standard that for all practical purposes amounts to judging on (in)consistency of challenged measures based on one (out of many) plausible scenarios?
Think of Korea-Various Measures on Beef for a moment. Complainants have not suffered trade
damage. The intent, the AB accepted, was Korea’s quest for punishing deceptive commercial practices
and protecting consumers. What did Korea do wrong? Maybe, the dual retail system could lead to
more Korean beef being sold in the future when the quota would have been rescinded. Maybe not. In
fact, the latter is more probable, since the Korean law imposed no switching costs if traders of Korean
beef were to turn to selling imported beef, which they would probably do when the quota would be
rescinded in light of the price differential between imported and domestic beef. Does the probability
that they might continue to sell more Korean beef suffice for Korea to be proclaimed the culprit in this
dispute?
To avoid misunderstandings, I am not suggesting that the AB should view a measure aiming to
protect health in the same way it reviews the legality of antidumping. Assuming the propensity to
commit mistakes is the same across WTO covered agreements, errors when a health policy is outlawed
can be devastating, whereas in the case of antidumping they will be limited to pure trade damage. I am
suggesting though, that, in the name of avoiding costly errors, the AB cannot do away with its selfimposed requirement to issue reasoned reports (US-Lamb, §106).
4.2 Keep them Happy
Overall, the members of the AB can pride in that they have not caused a major upheaval. Bar the issue
of providing a stage for amici curiae, a rather inconsequential decision that surprisingly provoked a
heated debate across the membership, no decision by the AB has provoked a (quasi) unanimous hostile
reaction. Furthermore, the membership has not voted with its feet. In Mavroidis and Sapir (2015), we
provided empirical evidence to the effect that there is no forum diversion. The number of disputes in
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the second decade of the AB is substantially lower than that in the first decade,15 but WTO members
still litigate only before the WTO. If it ain’t broke, no need to fix it then.
Absence of massive opposition to reports (à la amici curiae) does not mean that the membership
adheres to the findings of the AB. A brief perusal of the DSB minutes where reports are discussed
suffices to notice the dissatisfaction of many members with particular decisions.
The point here is that the authority of the AB has not been contested. Disagreements do occur, but
no one has requested total recall. The establishment of an exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes was
the holy grail of the negotiations though,16 and rationally trading nations have not been prepared to let
go one of their major achievements in the name of poor judgments. One should also not lose sight of
the fact that judgments are not costly. Cautiousness when human life/health is at stake avoids
disasters. Prospective remedies guarantee at the very least sufficient time to adjust.
In this I side with Ethier (2006) who explained why, in presence of uncertainty about the identity of
losers in adjudication, the common incentive is to opt for weak remedies. The AB seems to implicitly
at least acknowledge as much.
4.3 Keep them Happy?
Is this however, what the AB should be doing? Should it be happy when it has not provoked a major
upheaval? Is this the measure for success?
Horn et al. (2010), and Maggi and Staiger (2011) provide mutually reinforcing accounts why the
role of the judge is to ‘complete’ the contract through case law. Roughly, since trade agreements only
through generic language can address the various issues of trade integration, judges by specifying
rules to the facts of the case provide information about the coverage of existing disciplines, as well as
the manner in which they will be adjudicating future disputes. The judicial function understood in this
way is particularly relevant in the WTO context, where renegotiation of agreements is almost an
impossibility in light of the consensus-requirement.
To perform this function, judges must privilege methodology over political sensitivity or any other
similar concern. Furthermore, the two are not necessarily at odds. As stated above, in face of
uncertainty, it is quite rational for a judge to be extra cautious when human life/health is at risk. This
should be though the outcome of an intellectual process, a methodology that will attempt to link facts
to the relevant legal discipline. This is where the AB has failed, as the examples provided above have
attempted to show.

5. Concluding Remarks
The negotiators of the Uruguay round did not spend too much thinking about the AB. It was thought
more as a counterweight to the automaticity in establishing panels and adopting their reports, than
anything else. Furthermore, it is an entity that operates under severe time constraints, which, as
empirical analysis shows,17 it routinely respects. These are all mitigating factors that one should take
into account when discussing the quality of its output.

15
16
17

Note that the WTO counts members in the second decade than in its first.
In Mavroidis (2016a) I discuss the negotiating record in some detail.
Horn et al. (2011). This is quite something, and should not be taken lightheartedly. There is no theory explaining when
disputes arise in equilibrium (and, consequently, no theory distinguishing between good- and bad faith disputes), and
courts might often be surprised to see cases be submitted to them. On top of this, they must react within a few weeks, and
often, they have had no time to think about the issue before them. Case law, assuming it is reliable, can help address in
part at least this issue.
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One should also take into account the enormity of the task. WTO ‘courts’ are the busiest state-tostate courts in international relations. The AB was put in place in order to provide guidance regarding
the manner in which panels should understand WTO law. It is one case at a time as far as the AB is
concerned, and this should mean that it should cross that bridge when it comes to it, and not before.
Undeniably though, and by its own admission in its report on US-Stainless Steel (Mexico), panels
should cross that bridge in the way it has showed to them, and not in a different way (§§158-162). The
AB thus, has the responsibility to ensure that panels will cross bridges in a particular way. This is what
methodology amounts to.
The AB seems to neglect all this. The best proof that it has not honoured this task, its main task, is
the number of panel reports that it modifies or reverses. It simply cannot be that people do not get it.
There are cases of course, where panels have consciously deviated from prior case law established by
the AB. A couple of panels voluntarily did not adhere to the outlawing of zeroing by the AB, and
explained in plain English why this had been the case.18 But there must be something wrong when
panel reports cite the AB in support of their position, only to be reversed or modified by the AB a few
weeks later.
Reasoning in (almost) endogenous manner (what is politically acceptable?), it has failed often
enough to provide guidance how to resolve disputes. It is definitely not a coincidence that it routinely
overturns specific panel findings even on issues, like nondiscrimination, where case law should be
smooth by now in light of the ample opportunity the AB has had to set the record straight.
Furthermore, its inability to acknowledge that it has overturned itself perplexes the intended recipients
of its output (panels and disputing parties alike) as to which law applies where. Add the hundreds of
totally useless pages that hide the few important paragraphs, and you have the whole nine yards.
It is high time for drastic change. Legal drafting should improve. It is simply unnecessary to fill a
hundred plus pages only to state that the AB cannot decide the issue. It is equally unnecessary to see
the text of the Vienna Convention cited ad nauseam in every report, as it is to read the arguments by
parties repeated three and four times. An honest opposition to prior case law dealing with the same
issue will greatly help. The Vienna Convention is not surrogate for the missing methodology. It is a
checklist of elements that the AB can or may take into account. The methodology that it will employ
to adjudicate disputes is a totally different exercise. Judging from the record so far, this will be the
Everest that will need to climb in the years to come.
Post Scriptum
As I was finishing this paper, reports emerged to the effect that the US was opposed to the
reappointment of the Korean member of the AB.19 The reason given, according to the reports at least,
was that this member of the AB had participated in cases where the body had overstepped its mandate.
If true, then this is the first major crisis since the amici curiae saga that I have discussed above. It is
also a more important crisis by any benchmark, since this will be a first where a WTO member
opposes reappointment. The grounds mentioned to justify the decision complete the scenario.
In my view, the US action does not disturb the findings of Howse (2016). The mandate of the AB
can be overstepped irrespective of the subject matter of a dispute handled by the AB. I think it will be
a pity though, if the US were to limit its dissatisfaction to a person. After all, the individual they want
to see leave the body did not sign any dissenting opinions, which anyway are, on paper at least,

18

19

Mavroidis (2016), Chapter 2, volume 2 discusses them in detail. There are a few other, more nuanced cases of deviation,
like the standard employed in the panel report on EC-Commercial Vessels, when compared to the AB report on USOffset Act (Byrd Amendment).
Inside US Trade, World Trade on Line, Saturday 14 May, 2016.
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anonymous, and it is hard to discern what his influence has been in unanimous decisions that the US
obviously does not agree with. Anyway, the AB is by statute collectively responsible for its decisions.
In my view, this action will not solve the problem. It is high time that a serious, institutional debate
about the workings of the AB takes place within the WTO. Issues like the corporate governance of the
body, the selection process, the background and the role of the Secretariat (the clerks) should not be
taboos. So far, the only scrutiny comes from the annual reports written by academics, and is limited to
the quality of the output.20 The AB occupies only one provision in the DSU. It deserves substantially
more thinking.

20

The American Law Institute (ALI) first put together a group of academics that met annually and discussed the case law of
the previous year. This group has continued to meet annually and discuss the case law after the ALI left the project.
Papers are annually published in a commercial review, see
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displaySpecialPage?pageId=7624
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